

Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4083

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

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AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 14684

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, XC

SUBJ: KISSINGER VISIT PAPER: JAPANESE VIEWS ON SE ASIA:

"SIX MONTHS LATER"

REF: A. TOKYO 6616; B. TOKYO 8027

SUMMARY: IN OPENING ITS EMBASSY IN HANOI OCT 11,

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JAPAN SIGNED ITS HOPES THAT AN ERA OF CONFRONTA-

TION IN SE ASIA HAS ENDED AND A TIME OF HARMONY ARRIVED. IN CONTRAST TO FEARS OF APRIL WHEN PHNOM PENH AND SAIGON FELL TO INSURGENTS, JAPANESE NOW BELIEVE THAT CHANGES WILL NOT BE SO PROFOUND AND THAT JAPAN AND OTHERS SHOULD ACCEPT THE VICTORY OF THE INSURGENTS AS AN INEVITABLE HISTORICAL TREND AND IN A POSITIVE AND CONCILIATORY FASHION. OUTSIDE INDOCHINA, ASEAN STATES HAVE DEMONSTRATED MUCH MORE CONFIDENCE THAN IN THE FIRST PANICKY DAYS OF APRIL-MAY. CONCERNS OF ASEAN STATES ARE NOW WITH ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HANOI AND ITS INTENTIONS ARE NO LONGER THE PRIME PREOCCUPATION. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE TO "FILL THE VACCUUM" EXPECTED TO ENGULF THE REGION HAS AS WELL PROVED TO BE LESS VIRULENT THAN ANTICIPATED. JAPANESE NOW EXPECT AN INTERPLAY OF THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDIN JAPAN, TRYING TO RECKON WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES WHICH ARE NOW EXPECTED TO GUARD RATHER JELOUSLY THEIR INDEPENDENCE. JAPAN'S OWN ROLE WILL REMAIN PRIMARILY ECONOMIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE BUT POLITICAL CONSIERATIONS WILL INCREASINGLY INFLUENCE DECISIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES INVOLVING SIZEABLE INVESTMENT FUNDS. JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO FAVOR ASEAN OVER INDOCHINA AND MAJOR EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE WITH ASEAN ON INTERNAIONAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY IN THE UN. A FINAL THEME IN THIS ANALYSIS, BASES ON A WIDE RANGE OF RECENT CONVERSATIONS AND WRITINGS, IS THE STRONG DESIRE ON PART OF JAPAN'S ESTABLISHMENT THAT THE US CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN SE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. INDOCHINA: NATURAL EVOLUTION

THE SHOCK AND SCARE THAT THE FALL OF PHNOM PENH AND SAIGON TO COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES ENGENDERED IN JAPAN'S ESTABLISHMENT HAVE NOW DISSIPATED. CONCERN HAS BEEN MITIGATED BY TIME, CLEARER PERSPECTIVES AND BY DEVELOPMENTS THEMSELVES. CHANGES HAVE NOT BEEN SO PROFOUND AS INTIALLY EXPECTED IN APRIL. FONMIN
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MIYAZAWA'S COMMENT AT THE TIME TO EFFECT THAT THE EVENTS OF EARLY SPRING IN INDOCHINA WERE PART OF NATURAL TREND TOWARD SELF-DETERMINATION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY MOST JAPANESE AS IN FACT ACCURATE. US

POLICY IN INDOCHINA AND JAPAN'S SUPPORT FOR THAT POLICY WERE WELL-INTENTIONED, AS MIYAZAWA SAID, BUT IN RETROSPECT AN ABERRATION. WE WERE RESISTING

UNDERLYING FORCES AT WORK IN INDOCHINA AND INEVITABLY WOULD FINALLY FAIL. MILITARY METHODS EMPLOYED WERE INEFFECTIVE TOOLS. MOREOVER, OUR OPENING TO THE PRC RECOGNIZED THE LONGER HISTORICAL TREND FUNCTIONING IN ASIA AND IN FACT SUBVERTED THE WHOLE RATIONALE FOR US INDOCHINA POLICY. DEVELOPMENTS IN APRIL LIQUIDATED THOSE ANOMALIES.

2. REPERCUSSIONS OUTSIDE INDOCHINA

CHANGES OUTSIDE INDOCHINA IN REMAINDER OF SE ASIA HAVE BEEN EVEN LESS THAN EXPECTED. COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENTS IN PHNOM PENH AND SAIGON ONLY ACCELERATED TRENDS ALREADY UNDERWAY - SUCH AS RAPPROCHMENT WITH PRC BY MANILA AND BANGKOK. JAPANESE ANALYSTS DRAW THREE "LESSONS" FROM INDOCHINA: A) EACH COUNTRY MUST DEVELOP ITS OWN SELF-RELIANCE: B) INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT - SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL - IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WEAPONRY IN MAINTAINING A NATION'S SECURITY: C) JAPAN MUST CONSIDER MORE SERIOUSLY ITS OWN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. REGARDING POINT (C), WE NOTE, FOLLOWING INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS, JAPAN DID RECONSIDER ITS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND DECIDED TO SEEK CLOSER SECURITY AS WELL AS OTHER LINKS WITH THE US AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF GUARANTEEING THE FUTURE SECURITY OF JAPAN.

3. JAPANESE OBSERVERS GENERALLY REJECT ROBERT SHAPLEN'S THESIS (APRIL 1975 FOREIGN AFFAIRS - "SE ASIA -- BEFORE AND AFTER") THAT US EFFORTS IN SE ASIA HAD NOT "BOUGHT TIME" FOR THE NON-INDOCHINESE STATES. JAPANESE ANALYSTS REGARD THE CONTRARY AS TRUE. TO THOSE ANALYSTS, ASEAN STATES ARE ROUGHLY

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AT THE STAGE JAPAN WAS IN THE FIFTIES BEFORE THERE WAS ANY CERTAINTY THAT A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM WAS VIABLE IN JAPAN. SE ASIANS ARE OF COURSE YEARS AWAY FROM JAPAN'S CURRENT STATUS WHERE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IS NO LONGER IN DOUBT, BUT THEY HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 TOKYO 14684

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PROGRESS DURING THE INDOCHINA YEARS IN BUILDING
THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES.

4. ASSESSING PROSPECTS, JAPANESE USUALLY FOCUS ON
IMPACT OF INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS IN THAILAND, THE
MOST EXPOSED OF THE ASEAN STATES. THEY STRESS THE
INHERENT STRENGTH AND RESILIENCE OF THAILAND,
THAI FLEXIBILITY HISTORICALLY IN ACCOMMODATING
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EXTERNAL FORCES AND TRENDS WHILE MAINTAINING INTERNAL
INTEGRITY. IN THAILAND, EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS HAVE
BEEN UNDERTAKEN - RELATIONS ESTABLISHED

WITH PEKING AND MOVEMENT TOWARD RELATIONS WITH HANOI AND PHNOM PENH. THE PANIC EVIDENT IN BANGKOK AFTER SAIGON'S COLLAPSE HAS, FOLLOWING PM KUKRIT'S VISIT TO PEKING, BEEN REPLACED WITH CONFIDENCE IN THAILAND'S FUTURE. JAPANESE EXPECT THAILAND TO MOVE DOMESTICALLY IN MILDLY SOCIALIST DIRECTIONS. WHATEVER MAY BE FUTURE OF US BASES IN THAILAND, BANGKOK WILL REMAIN ACCESSIBLE TO JAPANESE, US, AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE. US POLITICAL INFLUENCE AS WELL WILL ALSO CONTINUE IN THAILAND AND ELSEWHERE, BOLSTERING ASEAN STATES' SELF RELIANCE IS THE KEY, AND THE MOST EFFICACIOUS WAY TO ASSIST SE ASIANS IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT IS NOT BY MILITARY FORCE BUT THROUGH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEANS TAILORED TO LOCAL RECEPTIVITY. BEARING THIS OUT, A PERCEPTIVE FONOFF OFFICIAL, WHO RETURNED RECENTLY FROM TWO AND HALF WEEKS' STUDY VISIT TO FIVE ASEAN STATES, TOLD US THAT ATTENTION IN ALL CAPITALS HAS TURNED FROM INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY. INDOCHINA WAS MENTIONED ONLY ONCE DURING HIS TRAVELS.

5. ROLES OF THE MAJOR POWERS.

ALTHOUGH THE US ROLE HAS BEEN ALL BUT ERADICATED IN INDOCHINA PENINSULA FOR THE MOMENT, SOVIET INFLUENCE GREATLY ENHANCED IN INDOCHINA THROUGH PROXY OF HANOI, AND CHINESE INFLUENCE ACCELERATED IN SEAN STATES (EXCEPT INDONESIA), JAPANESE EXPECT INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE OF MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING THAT OF JAPAN, TO BE DOMINANT FEATURE OF FUTURE SE ASIA. SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION, NOT PUPPETRY, WILL CHARACTERIZE SITUATION IN HANOI: CHINESE WILL EXERCISE PARAMOUNT EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA BUT CONCERN THAT TOO SEVERE COMPETITION WITH DRV COULD PUSH HANOI INTO TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE OF SOVIETS, WILL RESTRAIN PEKING IN ITS COMPEITION WITH HANOI DESPITE ADVANTAGE HELD BY CHINESE IN PHNOM PENH.
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DOMINANT POSITION HANOI NOW ENJOYS IN LAOS WILL HAVE TO BE SHARED SOMEWHAT WITH SOVIETS AND CHINESE. CHINESE INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE MODERATELY IN MOST ASEAN STATES, BUT EXCEPT IN EUROPE-ORIENTED MALAYSIA, US INFLUENCE WILL REMAIN PRIMARY IN ALL ASEAN STATES AHEAD OF JAPAN AND EUROPEAN POWERS. THESE ARE NOT PROSPECTS WHICH FRIGHTEN THE JAPANESE ESTABLISHMENT.

6. INSURGENCIES.

INSURGENCIES, ESPECIALLY IN CONTENTAL STATES OF THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, ARE EXPECTED TO GAIN SOME MOMENTUM AS RESULT OF VICTORIES IN INDOCHINA, BUT THEY WILL BE TROUBLESOME LOCALIZED PROBLEMS RATHER THAN THREATS TO GOVERNMENTS. CONCERN IS STILL WIDESPREAD IN JAPANESE ESTABLISHMENT THAT WEAPONS LEFT BY US IN INDOCHINA WILL SUPPLY INSURGENCIES BUT THIS FACTOR ALONE WILLNOT PROMISE SUCCESS TO INSURGENTS. GROWTH OF URBAN INSECURITY IN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA HAVE BECOME MATTERS OF MORE IMMEDIATE CONCERN THANPERSISTENT COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES. URBAN TERRORISM, A COMBINATION OF COMMUNALISM (IN MALAYSIA) AS RESULT OF "MALAYSIAN-IZATION" OF MALAYSIAN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES), BANDITRY AND OF BREAKDOWN OF CIVIL AUTHORITY HAVE NOTICEABLY AFFECTED ATTITUDES OF JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN TOWARD FUTURE INVESTMENT IN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. THREAT HAS LED MANY JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN TO DESIRE TO QUIT THAILAND AND MALAYSIA AND SOME DISINVESTMENT MAY BE IN PROSPECT. THESE PROBLEMS, HOWEVER ARE NOT PRIMARILY RELATED TO INSURGENTS' SUCCESS IN INDOCHINA.

7. ROLE AND POLICY OF JAPAN.

JAPAN'S ROLE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ECONOMIC BUT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONSWILL BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING. DECISION TO PROCEED WITH ENORMOUS ASAHAN ALUMINUM PROJECT IN INDONESIA, DESPITE ECONOMIC SQUEEZE IN JAPAN, IS CASE IN POINT. CONFORMING TO ASEAN STATES' RECIPTIVITY AN THEIR ABILITY TO ABSORB INVESTMENT, JAPAN WILL CONTINUE
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TO FAVOR ASEAN IN ITS FOREIGN INVESTMEN. TO RECKON WITH IMPACT OF THIS POLICY, MITI STUDIES INDICATE THAT 23 PERCENT OF JAPANESE OVERSEAS INVESTMENT, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OR \$2.9 BILLION OF TOTAL OF \$12.7 BILLION INVESTED OVERAEAS AT END OF 1974, WAS IN SE ASIAN MOSTLY ASEAN, STATES. CONTINUING SAME PROPORTION INTO 1980'S, AS MITI PROJECTS, ASEAN STATES COULD ANTICIPATE INVESTMENT TOTTALLING \$10 PLUS BILLION OF EXPECTED TOTAL OF \$45 BILLION PROJECTED OVERAEAS INVESTMENT BY 1980. LIKELY ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INVESTMENT OF SUCH DIMENSIONS IS VERY FAVORABLE TO PROSPECTS FOR ASEAN ECONOMIES. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONSARE ALSO INEVITABLE, BUT THEY SEEM LIKELY TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF US GOALS.

8. AS CONCOMITANT TO ECONOMIC SUPPORT, JAPAN'S

FORMERLY AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD ASEAN AS
AN ORGANIZATION HAS CHANGED TO UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT.
ASEAN IS NOW REGARDED BY JAPANESE AS A FORCE FOR
COHESION AGAINST WHATEVER THREAT MAY EMERGE FROM
INDOCHINA. AS RESULT, CONSULTATIONS WITH ASEAN LEADERS
HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP AND SINCE COLLAPSE IN SAIGON
JAPANESE LEADERS HAVE CONDUCTED TALKS WITH TOP
LEADERS OF ALL ASEAN STATES. (SUHARTO, LEE KUAN YEW,
CHATCHAI, RITHAUDDEEN, AND MS MARCOS HAVE ALL VISITED
TOKYO SINCE APRIL.) AS A POLICY PRINCIPLE, JAPAN

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WILL SEEK ACTIVELY TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE WITH
ASEAN BOTH IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT AND IN INTER-
NATIONAL FORA - ESPECIALLY THE UN.

9. JAPANESE ATTENTIONS HAVE NOT OF COURSE MET WITH
UNDILUTED WELCOME AMONG ASEANS. BUT ALTHOUGH THAIS,
MALAYSIANS, AND INDONESIANS ARE OFTEN CIRTICAL
OF JAPANESE BUSINESS METHODS AND INFLUENCE IN THEIR
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ECONOMIES, VIRTUALLY ALL ASEAN STATES SEEK INCREASED
JAPANESE INVESTMEN AND TRADE. SOME CRITICISM OF
JAPANESE INVESTMENT PRACTICES IS PRESUMABLY
INEVITABLE AND JAPANESE EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE IRRITATING
ASPECTS OF THEIR ROLE HAVE OFTEN BEEN LARGELY
COSMETIC, BUT SOME RECENT INITIATIVES APPEAR MORE
PROMISING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE JAPAN-THAILAND TECHNOLOGI-
CAL COOPERATION CENTER, WHICH IS BEING CONSTRUCTED IN
THAILAND REPRESENTS VEHICLE THROUGH WHICH JAPAN CAN OFFER GOJ AND
PRIVATE INVESTMENT "WITHOUT MEDDLING," ACCORDING TO
KEIDANREN OFFICIALS. SOME JAPANESE PLANNERS ARE
THINKING IN MORE RADICAL TERMS. THEY PROPOSE TO
ATTACK SOME PROBLEMS OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC RELATION-
SHIPS WITH SE ASIANS IN JAPAN ITSELF, BELIEVING
THAT THE ROOT CASE OF PROBLEMS MAY BE JAPAN'S
CLOSED SOCIETY AND ELITIST STRUCTURE AND
NOT JUST THE BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSMEN
ABROAD. IN ADDITION TO DEMOCRATIZING ENTRY
INTO AND TECHING IN UNIVERSITIES (INCLUDING
THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE OF ALLOWING FOREIGN
PROFESSORS TO TEACH "IN ENGLISH"), THESE
PLANNERS PROPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MANAGERIAL
TRAINING CENTER, STAFFED BY TALENT FROM JAPAN
AND ABROAD WITH A PROGRA CNDUCTED ENTIRELY IN
ENGLISH. TRAINING WOULD CONCENTRATE ON NATIONS
SUCH AS SE ASIANS, TRAINED IN JAPAN, AWARE OF
JAPAN'S SOCIETY, AND KNOWN TO JAPANESE MANAGEMENT,
THESE LEADERS WOULD RETURN TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES
MUCH MORE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO JAPAN.

10. AS COROLLARY TO INCRASED JAPANESE ECONOMIC
(AND POLITICAL) SUPPORT TO ASEAN STATES, JAPAN
ALSO ACTIVELY ENCOURAGES CONTINUED US ROLE AN
INFLUENCE IN ASEAN. ECHOING A THEME HEARD
REPEATEDLY BY FLOW OF VISITORS FROM ASEAN, JAPANESE
LEADERSHIP REGARDS IT AS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO
MAINTAIN ITS STRONG INTEREST IN ASEAN STATES.

11. INDOCHINA

WHILE MAINTAINING AFIRM BIAS FAVORING ASEAN NATIONS,
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JAPAN ALSO PURSUES RELATIONS WITH ALL THE
INDOCHINESE STATES, FOREMOST WITH HANOI. THROUGH
THIS CONNECTION FORMALIZED OCT 11 IN HANOI, JAPAN
IS WILLING TO SERVE AS A "CHANNEL" FOR THE US TO
INDOCHINESE STATES WITH WHICH WE MAINTAIN NO
TIES. JAPAN WILL ALSO BE SOMETHING OF A SURROGATE
WESTERN (US) INFLUENCE IN THOSE SAME STATES AND
HOPES EVENTUALLY TO GAIN AT LEAST SOME LIMITED
AND MODERATING INFLUENCE OVER THE POLICIES OF
THE INDOCHINESE GOVERNMENTS.

12. JAPANESE BELIEVE THE US WOULD BE WISE TO SEEK
TIES WITH THE INDOCHINESE STATES EARLIER RATHER
THAN LATER. GOJ REALIZES THAT, US PUBLIC AND
CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES ASIDE, WE ALSO RETAIN
SOME LEVERAGE THROUGH POLICIES OF ALOOFNESS TOWARD
HANOI, SAIGON AND PHNOM PENH, BUT JAPANESE ARE
AFRAID THAT LEVERAGE WILL DISSIPATE AS THOSE
GOVERNMENTS FORM THEIR BASIC PATTERNS OF INTER-
NATIONAL RLATIONS, GOJ IS SERIOUSLY DISTRUBED OVER USG
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NAM NGUM II PROJECT IN LAOS.
BY SO DOING, JAPANESE SUSPECT WE ABANDONED CHANCE
FOR INFLUENCE IN "NEW LAOS" AND HANDED MOSCOW
AN "ASWAN" IN INDOCHINA. VETO OF UN MEMBERSHIP FOR SVN AND NVN IS
REGARDED ALSO AS MYOPIC AND PUNITIVE. JAPANESE BELIEVE WE
SHOULD AT LEAST TEST MODERATE APPEALS CURRENT
FROM SAIGON AND HANOI SEEKING RESTORED RELATIONS.
THEY BELIEVE INDEPENDENT MINDED HANOI WOULD PREFER
TO PLAY OFF INFLUENCE OF US, USSR AND PRC, ONE
AGAINST OTHER TWO, THAN TO BE WEDGED TIGHTLY
BETWEEN COMPETITION OF TWO COMMUNIST POWERS. IN
JAPANESE VIEW, US MAY FOREFEIT OPPORTUNITY TO
INFLUENCE INDOCHINA IF WE FREEZE RELATIONS FOR
MOE THAN A DECENT PAUSE.

13. CONCLUSIONS.

OVERALL, JAPANESE REGARD DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
AS OFFERING NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND AS PROVIDING A
TIME FOR CONCILIATION. PERIOD OF CNFLICT HAS
ENDED AND MORE NATURAL BLENDING OF INDIGENOUS
FORCES CAN SUPPLANT CONFRONTATION OF PAST. OF
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BROADER IMPORTANCE, A MAJOR IRRITANT HAS BEEN ELIMINATED
IN RELATONS BETWEEN THE US AND PRC, AND BY
EXTENSION, IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. FURTHERMORE,
AS AN ASAHI SHIMBUN EDITORIAL RECENTLY ASSERTED,
"THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR LED TO CALMING OF THE
ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS WHICH HAD BECOME A DEEP-
ROOTED UNDERCURRENT IN JAPAN EVEN SINCE THE POST-
COLD WAR AGE." JAPAN-US RELATIONS HAVE NOW
REACHED A "WINDLESS AGE." TO JAPANESE, DESPITE
PROSPECTS FOR COMPETITION IN SE ASIA AMONG OUTSIDE
POWERS AND WITH HANOI'S INTENTIONS STILL UNCLEAR,
A PERIOD OF RELATIVE HARMONY IN SE ASIA, NEVERTHELESS,
APPEARS POSSIBLY AT HAND.
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